Valuing the reload features of executive stock options
Read Online
Share

Valuing the reload features of executive stock options by Steven Huddart

  • 266 Want to read
  • ·
  • 48 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

Subjects:

  • Employee stock options -- Valuation -- United States.,
  • Employee stock options -- Prices -- United States.,
  • Executives -- Salaries, etc. -- United States.

Book details:

Edition Notes

StatementSteven Huddart, Ravi Jagannathan, Jane Saly.
SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper 7020, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 7020.
ContributionsJagannathan, Ravi., Saly, P. Jane 1950-, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsHB1 .W654 no. 7020
The Physical Object
Pagination25, [7] p. :
Number of Pages25
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL22400141M

Download Valuing the reload features of executive stock options

PDF EPUB FB2 MOBI RTF

for valuing executive stock options with reload features. Our main example is a Norwest Corporation option grant with a single reload. The number of new options granted under the provision equals the number of shares tendered to pay the exercise price plus any taxes due on exercise. In this case, the reload feature adds 24 percent to the value of a. Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. , the grant date value of executive stock options excludes the value of any reload feature because, at the time of writing the standard in , the Financial Accounting Standards Board believed it was not feasible to value a reload feature .   Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. , the grant date value of executive stock options excludes the value of any reload feature because, at the time of writing the standard in , the Financial Accounting Standards Board believed it was not feasible to value a reload feature at the grant by: For options with a Reload feature, the holder is automatically entitled to new options when the initial option is exercised. Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. , the grant date value of executive stock options excludes the value of a reload feature because the Financial Accounting Standards Board believes it is not feasible to value a reload feature at the grant date.

Downloadable (with restrictions)! The need to value complex options containing reload features is becoming increasingly more common as such options become more proliferate. Traditionally, two types of valuation methods have been used: the intrinsic method and closed-form models, such as Black-Scholes. These methodologies undervalue options with reload features, a fact recently recognized . an executive holds reload options with strike price $10 and she exercises when the stock price is $ The executive surrenders ×$10 $15 = shares to pay the strike price and receives new options, in addition to receiving the remaining shares worth ×$15 = $ After large stock price drops, which cause executives’ existing options to lose much of their. 4In symbols, if K denotes the strike price and S the stock price when the reload option is exercised, the executive receives K=S new options for each original option exercised, plus $ðS KÞ worth of stock.   Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. recommends that reload options be valued at the time the reload feature is activated and not at the time of the initial grant. We demonstrate that ignoring the reload feature at the time of the initial grant can substantially understate the value of the option granted.

  However, stock options are different. GAAP requires employers to calculate the fair value of the stock option and record compensation expense based on this number. Businesses should use a mathematical pricing model designed for valuing stock. The business should also reduce the fair value of the option by estimated forfeitures of stock. The Valuation of Executive Stock Options when Executives Can Influence the Payoffs 1. Introduction It is a widely accepted result that executives value stock options at lower than market or Black-Scholes-Merton values. This belief is due to the fact that executives are typically. Companies continued to increase the options they gave to CEOs, although each option had a lower value because of the stock market’s poor performance, the Times noted, adding that on average, the. Real Options SLS Guide; Modeling Risk (2nd Edition) Real Options Analysis (2nd Edition) Advanced Analytical Models; Valuing Employee Stock Options; Modeling Risk; Applied Risk Analysis; Real Options Analysis Course; Real Options Analysis (1st Edition) What Is So Real About Real Options, and Why Are They Optional? Faith Journey; Managing Your.